Nigerians await election results in competitive race. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were convinced that it had occurred. Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. 10. He is the author of Shadow War: The Secret War in Laos, as well as several short studies on special operations, including The War in Cambodia (Osprey Books, 1988), The War in Laos (Osprey Books, 1989), and Southeast Asian Special Forces (Osprey Books, 1990). 8. Naval Institute. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. Listen to McNamara's conversation with Johnson. PTF-1 and PTF-2 were U.S.-built 1950s vintage boats pulled out of mothballs and sent to Vietnam. WebGulf of Tonkin conspiracy. The reports conclusions about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident are particularly relevant as they offer useful insights into the problems that SIGINT faces today in combating unconventional opponents and the potential consequences of relying too heavily on a single source of intelligence. Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution - Definition, Cause & Significance And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. Even in the darkness, the commandos could see their targeta water tower surrounded by a few military buildings. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. The history stops with the U.S. Navy moving into full combat duty -- the naval and air interdictions in South and North Vietnam -- the subject of future volumes. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. 1, p. 646. Vietnam is a very watery country. His assessment of the evidence now raised doubts in his mind about what really had happened. The crews quietly made last-minute plans, then split up. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. 9. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. WebGulf of Tonkin Resolution, also called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resolution put before the U.S. Congress by Pres. The Pentagon had already released details of the attack, and administration officials had already promised strong action. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." Aircraft from Ticonderoga arrived on-scene at 1528 hours and fired on the boats. On 30 July, Westmoreland revised the 34A maritime operations schedule for August, increasing the number of raids by "283% over the July program and 566% over June. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. The basic story line of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is as follows: At approximately 1430 hours Vietnam time on August 2, 1964, USS Maddox (DD-731) detected three North Vietnamese torpedo boats approaching at high speed. Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. 1. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, Americas Last Vietnam Battle (Hippocrene Books, 1994), and Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990). . Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorized President Lyndon Johnson to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands. Badly damaged, the boat limped home. Subscribe now and never hit a limit. The first such Desoto mission was conducted off the North Vietnamese coast in February 1964, followed by more through the spring. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. 2, pp. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American Hickman, Kennedy. Milestones: 19611968 - Office of the Historian On 28 July, the latest specially fitted destroyer, the Maddox (DD-731), set out from Taiwan for the South China Sea. WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. The NSA report exposes translation and analytical errors made by the American SIGINT analystserrors that convinced the naval task force and national authorities that the North had ordered a second attack on August 4, and thus led Maddoxs crew to interpret its radar contacts and other information as confirmation that the ship was again under attack. Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. originally appeared in the June 2008 issue of Vietnam magazine. By 1400 hours EDT, the president had approved retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases for the next morning, August 5, at 0600 local time, which was 1900 EDT on August 4 in Washington. The lack of success in SOGs missions during the first few months of 1964 made this proposal quite attractive. In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. Then North Vietnams naval authorities either became confused or were seized by indecision. What really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964? Media Manipulation. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. . A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. The North also protested the South Vietnamese commando raid on Hon Me Island and claimed that the Desoto Mission ships had been involved in that raid. Codenamed Desoto, they were special U.S. Navy patrols designed to eavesdrop on enemy shore-based communicationsspecifically China, North Korea, and now North Vietnam. On July 31, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off North Vietnam. Office of the Historian The Dollar Bill . In the first few days of August 1964, a series of events off the coast of North Vietnam and decisions made in Washington, D.C., set the United States on a course that would largely define the next decade and weigh heavily on American foreign policy to this day. Both South Vietnamese and U.S. maritime operators in Da Nang assumed that their raids were the cause of the mounting international crisis, and they never for a moment doubted that the North Vietnamese believed that the raids and the Desoto patrols were one and the same. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. 8. $22. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. . . We have no intention of yielding to pressure. There was more or less general acceptance of the Navy's initial account -- there was an unprovoked attack on Aug. 2 by three North Vietnamese patrol boats on an American warship, the destroyer USS Maddox in international waters. The conspiracy theory has been dying for several years, and this work will probably be a stake through its heart. The battle was over in 22 minutes. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. The attack is a signal to us that the North Vietnamese have the will and determination to continue the war." Meanwhile, by late August 3, the North Vietnamese had learned the condition of their torpedo boats and ordered a salvage tug to recover the damaged craft. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 Gulf of Tonkin incident - Wikipedia We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. The Science of Conspiracy Theories - Gulf of Tonkin conspiracy For the maritime part of the covert operation, Nasty-class fast patrol boats were purchased quietly from Norway to lend the illusion that the United States was not involved in the operations. The two boats headed northeast along the same route they had come, then turned south for the run back to South Vietnam. He headed seaward hoping to avoid a confrontation until daybreak, then returned to the coast at 1045, this time north of Hon Me. At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. McNamara took advantage of Morses imprecision and concentrated on the senators connection between 34A and Desoto, squirming away from the issue of U.S. involvement in covert missions by claiming that the Maddox "was not informed of, was not aware [of], had no evidence of, and so far as I know today had no knowledge of any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands Senator Morse referred to." Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. Fluoride. Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, Maddox was approached by the North Vietnamese. Hickman, Kennedy. Navy, Of course, none of this was known to Congress, which demanded an explanation for the goings-on in the Tonkin Gulf. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. He spoke out against banning girls education. Oklahoma City Bombing. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. 9/11. As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on North Vietnamese military capabilities. The study debunks two strongly held but opposing beliefs about what happened on both dayson the one hand that neither of the reported attacks ever took place at all, and on the other that there was in fact a second deliberate North Vietnamese attack on August 4. More important, they did not know the North Vietnamese had begun to react more aggressively to the commando raids. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m.. 13. American aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese boats. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. no isolated event. It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. 14. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. The three torpedo boats continued through the American barrage and launched their torpedoes at 1516. The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1983), p. 18. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. 15. Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. And, of course, McNamara himself knew about the "South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands," but his cautiously worded answer got him out of admitting it.